Game theory equilibrium concepts
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any point in the game, the players' behavior from that point onward should represent a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game (i.e. of the subgame), no matter what happened before. Every finite extensive game with perfect recall has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Perfect recall is a term introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953 and "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves". A common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria in the case of a finite game is backward induction. Here one first considers the last actions of the game and determines which actions the final mover should take in each possible circumstance to maximize his/her utility. One then supposes that the last actor will do these actions, and considers the second to last actions, again choosing those that maximize that actor's utility. This process continues until one reaches the first move of the game. The strategies which remain are the set of all subgame perfect equilibria for finite-horizon extensive games of perfect information. However, backward induction cannot be applied to games of imperfect or incomplete information because this entails cutting through non-singleton information sets. A subgame perfect equilibrium necessarily satisfies the one-shot deviation principle. The set of subgame perfect equilibria for a given game is always a subset of the set of Nash equilibria for that game. In some cases the sets can be identical. The ultimatum game provides an intuitive example of a game with fewer subgame perfect equilibria than Nash equilibria. (Wikipedia).
Mod-05 Lec-37 Backward Induction
Game Theory and Economics by Dr. Debarshi Das, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati. For more details on NPTEL visit http://nptel.iitm.ac.in
From playlist IIT Guwahati: Game Theory and Economics | CosmoLearning.org Economics
19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
Game Theory (ECON 159) We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. We show the other
From playlist Game Theory with Ben Polak
Mod-05 Lec-38 Backward Induction: Exercises
Game Theory and Economics by Dr. Debarshi Das, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati. For more details on NPTEL visit http://nptel.iitm.ac.in
From playlist IIT Guwahati: Game Theory and Economics | CosmoLearning.org Economics
Nash Equilibriums // How to use Game Theory to render your opponents indifferent
Check out Brilliant ► https://brilliant.org/TreforBazett/ Join for free and the first 200 subscribers get 20% off an annual premium subscription. Thank you to Brilliant for sponsoring this playlist on Game Theory. Game Theory Playlist ► https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLHXZ9OQGMqx
From playlist Game Theory
Equilibrium occurs when the overall state of a system is constant. Equilibrium can be static (nothing in the system is changing), or dynamic (little parts of the system are changing, but overall the state isn't changing). In my video, I'll demonstrate systems in both types of equilibrium,
From playlist Physics
2D Equilibrium -- Balancing Games
How does everything even out? Learn what 2D Equilibrium is and how it effects the balance of life. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA More information at http://k12videos.mit.edu/terms-conditions
From playlist Measurement
18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
Game Theory (ECON 159) We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midterm. We represent what a player does not know within a game using an information set: a collection of nodes among which the player cannot distingui
From playlist Game Theory with Ben Polak
Mod-05 Lec-36 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Game Theory and Economics by Dr. Debarshi Das, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati. For more details on NPTEL visit http://nptel.iitm.ac.in
From playlist IIT Guwahati: Game Theory and Economics | CosmoLearning.org Economics
What Is Dynamic Equilibrium? | Reactions | Chemistry | FuseSchool
What Is Dynamic Equilibrium? | Reactions | Chemistry | FuseSchool Learn about dynamic equilibrium, the conditions required for dynamic equilibrium to be reached and examples of systems at equilibrium. SUPPORT US ON PATREON https://www.patreon.com/fuseschool SUBSCRIBE to the FuseSchool
From playlist CHEMISTRY: Reactions
Games, Solution Concepts, and Mechanism Design: A Very Short Introduction - Jing Chen
Jing Chen Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Member, School of Mathematics November 6, 2012 I present some of the very fundamental notions in game theory, with emphasis on their role in the theory of mechanism design and implementation. Examples include (1) normal-form games: Nash e
From playlist Mathematics
Games, Solution Concepts, and Mechanism Design: A Very Short Introduction - Jing Chen
Jing Chen Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Member, School of Mathematics November 6, 2012 I present some of the very fundamental notions in game theory, with emphasis on their role in the theory of mechanism design and implementation. Examples include (1) normal-form games: Nash e
From playlist Mathematics
Kousha Etessami: The complexity of computing a quasi perfect equilibrium for n player extensive form
We study the complexity of computing/approximating several classic refinements of Nash equilibrium for n-player extensive form games of perfect recall EFGPR, including perfect, quasi-perfect, and sequential equilibrium. We show that, for all of these refinements, approximating one such equ
From playlist HIM Lectures: Trimester Program "Combinatorial Optimization"
ReBeL - Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning and Search for Imperfect-Information Games (Explained)
#ai #technology #poker This paper does for Poker what AlphaZero has done for Chess & Go. The combination of Self-Play Reinforcement Learning and Tree Search has had tremendous success in perfect-information games, but transferring such techniques to imperfect information games is a hard p
From playlist Papers Explained
Game theory (3), more complicated strategies and equilibria.
This video elaborates on the concept of stable strategies and evolutionary equilibria to include polymorphisms of pure strategies and the evolution of mixed strategies such as phenotypic plasticity.
From playlist TAMU: Bio 312 - Evolution | CosmoLearning Biology
How To Create Top-Down RPG For Game In Unity | Session 05 | #unity | #gamedev
Don’t forget to subscribe! In this project series, we will learn to create a Top-Down RPG in Unity for the enemy game. We will develop a great RPG enemy AI. In this series, we'll be analyzing and experimenting with different types of enemies, AI, behaviors, and also randomly generating t
From playlist Create Top-Down RPG For Game In Unity
Game theory was originally proposed to model the economic behavior of rational agents. Besides the introduction of influential concepts in economics and finance, it provided useful tools in other human-related fields such as sociology, politics and military strategy. The framework appeared
From playlist Wolfram Technology Conference 2021