Self-enforcing agreement
A self-enforcing agreement is an agreement that is enforced only by the parties to it; no external party can enforce or interfere with the agreement. (In this respect it differs from an enforceable co
Mertens-stable equilibrium
In game theory, Mertens stability is a solution concept used to predict the outcome of a non-cooperative game. A tentative definition of stability was proposed by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Merte
Sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson. A sequential equilibrium specifies not only a strategy for eachof the playe
Solution concept
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, th
Evolutionarily stable strategy
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific environment, that is to say it cannot be displ
Subgame perfect equilibrium
In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if
Correlated equilibrium
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. It was first discussed by mathematician Robert Aumann in 1974. The idea is tha
Folk theorem (game theory)
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games. The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equ
Divine equilibrium
The Divinity Criterion or Divine Equilibrium or Universal Divinity is a refinement of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a signaling game proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987). One of the most widely applie
Pooling equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibria result of a signaling game. In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players in the game. Signaling actions are chosen
Quasi-perfect equilibrium
Quasi-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to Eric van Damme. Informally, a player playing by a strategy from a quasi-perfect equilibrium takes observed
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium selection is a concept from game theory which seeks to address reasons for players of a game to select a certain equilibrium over another. The concept is especially relevant in evolutionar
Manipulated Nash equilibrium
In game theory, a Manipulated Nash equilibrium or MAPNASH is a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium used in dynamic games of imperfect information. Informally, a strategy set is a MAPNASH of a ga
Stochastically stable equilibrium
In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by and Peyton Young. An evolutionary stable state S is also
Abstract economy
In theoretical economics, an abstract economy (also called a generalized N-person game) is a model that generalizes both the standard model of an exchange economy in microeconomics, and the standard m
Epsilon-equilibrium
In game theory, an epsilon-equilibrium, or near-Nash equilibrium, is a strategy profile that approximatelysatisfies the condition of Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive
Risk dominance
Risk dominance and payoff dominance are two related refinements of the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution concept in game theory, defined by John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. A Nash equilibrium is consid
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
In game theory, trembling hand perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium due to Reinhard Selten. A trembling hand perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium that takes the possibility of off-
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
The concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium applies to certain "noncooperative" environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments.It emphasizes
Satisfaction equilibrium
In game theory, a satisfaction equilibrium is a solution concept for a class of non-cooperative games, namely games in satisfaction form. Games in satisfaction form model situations in which players a
Quantal response equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a solution concept in game theory. First introduced by Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey,it provides an equilibrium notion with bounded rationality. QRE is not
Berge equilibrium
The Berge equilibrium is a game theory solution concept named after the mathematician Claude Berge. It is similar to the standard Nash equilibrium, except that it aims to capture a type of altruism ra
Proper equilibrium
Proper equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium due to Roger B. Myerson. Proper equilibrium further refines Reinhard Selten's notion of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium by assuming that mor
Intuitive criterion
The intuitive criterion is a technique for equilibrium refinement in signaling games. It aims to reduce possible outcome scenarios by restricting the possible sender types to types who could obtain hi
M equilibrium
M equilibrium is a set valued solution concept in game theory that relaxes the rational choice assumptions of perfect maximization (“no mistakes”) and perfect beliefs (“no surprises”). The concept can
Gibbs measure
In mathematics, the Gibbs measure, named after Josiah Willard Gibbs, is a probability measure frequently seen in many problems of probability theory and statistical mechanics. It is a generalization o
Nash equilibrium
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after the mathematician John Nash, is the most common way to define the solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players. In a Nash equilibr
Symmetric equilibrium
In game theory, a symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players use the same strategy (possibly mixed) in the equilibrium. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game pictured to the right, the only Na
Self-confirming equilibrium
In game theory, self-confirming equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium for extensive form games, in which players correctly predict the moves their opponents make, but may have misconcept
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
In game theory, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an equilibrium concept relevant for dynamic games with incomplete information (sequential Bayesian games). It is a refinement of Bayesian Nash e
Markov perfect equilibrium
A Markov perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium concept in game theory. It has been used in analyses of industrial organization, macroeconomics, and political economy. It is a refinement of the concept
Strong Nash equilibrium
In game theory a strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no coalition, taking the actions of its complements as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits all of its member